Question Details

(Solved) CASE and W. Estes. "The Project Management and Conduct." 19S5 Project ManagementJour- EtTective Independent ProjA. "A Key...


From the Meredith and Mantel textbook, (Project Management: A Managerial Approach). Review Chapter 12, Project Auditing, Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): Five Failures and Counting (B) Case Study, pp. 541-543. Once you have reviewed the case study, write a minimum of 600 words in length defending your responses to the following questions.

ï· Do you think this was a financial audit, a project audit, or a management audit? Why?

ï· Was the purpose of the audit to exert cybernetic control, go/no-go control, or post project control? Explain?

ï· Given the comments in the case, do you surmise that the reason for the audit was to improve future projects or to ascertain the reasons for not meeting the projectâs goals, and if the latter, its direct goals or ancillary goals?

ï· Do you think the GAO was the best choice for an audit team? Would it have the trust of the project personnel?

ï· Given the minimal elements of a project audit present in Section 12.2, which element(s) would have been primary to the audit team? Why? Which section would have contained the âunderlying problemsâ reported in the case?

Your assignment must:

ï· Be a minimum of 600 words in length.

ï· Be typed, double-spaced, using Times New Roman font (size 12), with one-inch margins on all sides; citations and references must follow APA format. Check with your professor for any additional instructions.

CASE and W. E. Estes. "The Project Management and Conduct." 19S5 Project ManagementJour- EtTective Independent ProjA. "A Key to
1995.
April
Network, J. Zaller. "The Ethics Audit for
G., and A. PM Network, April 1998. .31 1 Shenhar, A. J., O.
Levy, and D. Dvir, "Mapping the
Dimensions of Project
Success." Project Management
Journal,
June 1997.
Walker, M. G. and R.
Bracey. "Independent Auditing As
Project Control."
Datamation, March 1980.
Webster's New Twentieth
Century Dictionary, Unabridged.
2nd ed., Wm. Collins
Publishers, Inc. USA. 1980. followingcase concerns a multiphase U.S. Army missile development
program. The first phase was difficult. and six
flight tests ended in failure. with the contractor paying millions of
dollars in fines for the failures. However. the
and
the Pentagon decided to
successful,
skip a third planned
twotests were
i
test and
and Manufacturing Development.
to the next phase of
gNm—Engineering
Before doing so. however. move directly
S.
an
audit of the program's progress
pN was requested of the U. Government Accountability Office. The
thedate
case
reports
the
underlying problems revealed
and the lessons learned by the program managers.
by,theaudit ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE
FIVE FAILURES AND COUN'IING
Tom Cross, Alan Beckenstein, and Tim Laseter DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFF)CE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY
ACQUISmON LOGISTICS AND
TECHNOLOGY
103ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGION DC 20310-0103 2004. John West and Joy Adams had been
It wasJuly
a lot since the THAAD program had begun in
through
ElevenTHAAD flight tests had been conducted in
1992.
and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Phase.
theProgramDefinition the first successful missile-toAftersix initial failures,
missile target was achieved
ballistic
a
of
intercept
missile
Test 10. West and Adams
Flight
during
onJune10, 1999,
they had learned.
lessons
on the contract
reflected —June
conductedby both Department of Defense and
Studies
sources identified the following underlying
independent
problemsin the THAAD program: The program's compressed flight-test schedule
did not allow for adequate ground testing, and as
by permission Copyright by the University of Virginia
*Reprinted
Schoolfoundation, Charlottesville, VA.
Darden a result, officials could not detect problems prior
to flight tests. The schedule also left insufficient
time for preflight testing, post-flight analysis, and
corrective action.
The requirementto be able to quickly deploy an
early prototype system diverted the contractor
and government project management's attention away from the normal interceptor development
process and resulted in interceptors that were not
equipped with sufficient instruments to provide
optimum test data. Quality assurance received insufficient emphasis
and resources during the time of component production, resulting in unreliable components. The contract for developing the interceptor was a cost-plus-fixed-feecontract, a contract type that
placed all of the program's financialrisk on the
government and did not include provisions that could bc used (o hold
less than blight-test to jncct by had been Cacturing detects rather than
technology. onstrating that it could celinbly ejiil)loy
technology critical to IAAlYs
tured progratn addtvssed each ol' the
underlying problejns, It with cojnjjonent jcvcj
tenting, quality control
dcnign
ond tentin 'llie
coo" lengthened the flight-test schedule and increased
ground testing
rernoved the requitvjnen( Cor the deployable,
early prototype interceptor;
increased the contractor's quality enjphasis,
including its conunittnent, leadership, and quality
assurance staffing modified the cost-plus-fixed-feecontract to provide performance-based incentives and penalties
and introduced a degree of cornpetitioninto the
program.
Despite these changes, the reliability of the remaining
flight-test interceptors remained a concern because most
components were produced when the contractor's quality assurance system was inadequate. Cont ract Perfornjanec l,essons I ,earned
The THAAD PDRR missiles had not yet demonstrated any military capability. Acquiring a
significant number of missiles from the current
design to support a contingency deployment concept was unwise. The hardware for the remaining missiles had been built and procured several
years before, and only minor changes or upgrades
could be made to the existing hardware. Until new hardware was built that incorporated the necessary design changes and improved manufacturing,
product assurance, and test processes, there was
no reason to expect any significantimprovement
in the THAAD missile's performance.
Stable program funding and guidance was essential for program success. That was especially
true with a complex "cutting-edge" technology program such as THAAD. Pressures to quickly
field a prototype, budget cuts, program restructuring, and the misapplication of the principles of
acquisition reform all strongly influenced the programmatic decisions. The Program Management lcvcl quality ond reliability would
integrated More thorough ground and
sijnulotiontesting of the bly, and especially the
seeker,
Conned. Due to the %trong nccdcdto
the Program Management DOT&E
Office had
ractor and chartered'
hardware-in-the-loop testing
government
capabilities
team would provide
recommendation%
on where
improvements were needed to
end-to-end integrated missiles permit testingof
and
subsystems (e.g., divert attitude to test critical
seeker, avionics package, etc.). controlsystem Contract Ad"linisl ration Lessons
Learned
A solid teaming environment
(Battle Rhythm
concept) early in the program life
cycle,
ing all THAAD stakeholders (DCMA, includ.
THAAD
Program Office (TPO), the prime
contractor,and
subcontractors) was critical to
solving poten.
tial problems prior to any major milestone/funding decision points. This resulted in a
proactive,
solution-oriented business environment,
where issues were identified with real-time resolution.
Prime contractor DCMA Commander needed
to
participate actively in the Award Fee process,and
THAAD stakeholders needed to participatein the Award Fee process, to address the then current
program risk factors as determinedby theAward
Fee Board, to focus contractor risk mitigation
efforts to reduce program risk, and to ensureover. all mission success.
Utilization of an electronic data managementsys- tem to provide all players real-timeinformation
of all aspects of the program, from basiccontract
modifications to 11T minutes to programmatrices, which had been paramount to the Battle
Rhythm initiative success. CASE THAADprogram entered the engineering and
development (EMD) phase in 2000, with
manufacturing
a $3.8 billion contract to Lockheed Martin
theawardof Company. West and Adams had used the spaceSystems
lessons learned and incorporated unique incencontract
the EMD contract (Exhibit l).
Evesinto
2000 and 2003, THAAD engineers reworked
Between
fixed many of its inherent problems
entiresystemand In May 2004, production of 16 flight test
ardrdundancies.
Martin's new production faciliLockheed
beganat
missiles
Flight testing of the EMI)
Alabama.
in PikeCounty,
wasscheduledto begin in early 2005 and continue
expected to enter low-rate productill20. The system was
operating
capability (IOC) in 2007.
initial
don,to support Thenin the development phase, THAAD was implea block development strategy designed to get
menting the THAAD system into the hands of our soldiers as
quickly as possible, using the latest technology in the
most affordable manner. Each two-year blcxk (Blexk
2004, 2006, and 2008) built on and integrated with the
capabilitiesof the predecessorblock. Ihe program continued to refine and mature the system design to ensure
that the element performed to an acceptable standard
and could be produced efficiently and maintained.
ms would be accomplished by continuing current
component design and development activities, robust
ground tests, and quality assurance programs. Flighttesting would resume in late
at White Sands Missile Range, transitioningto the Pacific Missile Range
Facilityin Hawaii in 2006 to test against representative
threat systems. Special Incentives for SuccessfulFlight Tests
in THAAD Award Fee Contract
The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) contract for $3.8 billion was awarded to Lockheed Martin Space Systems
Company, Missile and Space Operations (LMSSC/M&SO),Sunnyvale, CA, on June 28, 2000.
The THAAD EMD contract is an award fee type contract. The functional performance areas are
technical, management, schedule and cost.
Emphasis was placed on the importance of successful flight tests occumng on schedule and
within cost by including in the contract an award fee pool with special incentives for successful
flight test intercepts for the first two flight attempts at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR)
and Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR). If Lockheed Martin achieves a successful intercept
within the first two attempts at WSMR, they will receive $25M in award fee. However, if they
are unsuccessful after the first attempt, LM will share $15M of the contract cost. If Lockheed
Martin achieves a successful intercept within the first two attempts at KMR, they will receive
$25M in award fee. However, if they are unsuccessful after the first attempt, LM will share
$20M of the contract cost. The clause identifies technical parameters that must be met during
each of the first two flight tests at both ranges.
The use of the alpha contracting process for development of the scope of work (SOW) and
the integrated Master Plan and Master Schedule as well as proposal preparation/evaluation
provided the government with a best value contract. ne Integrated Master Plan (IMP)
provides the process narratives, events and criteria for the EMD program. The Integrated Master
Schedule (IMS) provides the detail tasks and schedule for implementing the IMP. Both of these
documents were developed during the alpha contracting process, substantially reducing the
normal negotiation time and promoting a better understanding of the EMD requirements and
the contractor-proposed approach to meeting these requirements. EXHIBIT' I Army Acquisition Reform Newsletter.

 


Solution details:
STATUS
Answered
QUALITY
Approved
ANSWER RATING

This question was answered on: Sep 05, 2019

PRICE: $18

Solution~000200160101.zip (25.37 KB)

Buy this answer for only: $18

This attachment is locked

We have a ready expert answer for this paper which you can use for in-depth understanding, research editing or paraphrasing. You can buy it or order for a fresh, original and plagiarism-free solution (Deadline assured. Flexible pricing. TurnItIn Report provided)

Pay using PayPal (No PayPal account Required) or your credit card . All your purchases are securely protected by .
SiteLock

About this Question

STATUS

Answered

QUALITY

Approved

DATE ANSWERED

Sep 05, 2019

EXPERT

Tutor

ANSWER RATING

GET INSTANT HELP/h4>

We have top-notch tutors who can do your essay/homework for you at a reasonable cost and then you can simply use that essay as a template to build your own arguments.

You can also use these solutions:

  • As a reference for in-depth understanding of the subject.
  • As a source of ideas / reasoning for your own research (if properly referenced)
  • For editing and paraphrasing (check your institution's definition of plagiarism and recommended paraphrase).
This we believe is a better way of understanding a problem and makes use of the efficiency of time of the student.

NEW ASSIGNMENT HELP?

Order New Solution. Quick Turnaround

Click on the button below in order to Order for a New, Original and High-Quality Essay Solutions. New orders are original solutions and precise to your writing instruction requirements. Place a New Order using the button below.

WE GUARANTEE, THAT YOUR PAPER WILL BE WRITTEN FROM SCRATCH AND WITHIN YOUR SET DEADLINE.

Order Now